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Abstract—This paper investigates artificial noise (AN) injection
along the temporal and spatial dimensions of a legitimate system to
secure its transmissions from potential eavesdropping. In particu-
lar, we consider a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) orthog-
onal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) system in the pres-
ence of a multiple-antenna passive eavesdropper and characterize
both the secrecy rate and average secrecy rate of the legitimate
system. We assume that the legitimate transmitter knows the full
channel state information (CSI) of the links connecting it with its
legitimate receiver but does not know the instantaneous CSI of the
passive eavesdropper. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy rate
and average secrecy rate are derived for the asymptotic case of
a large number of transmit antennas. We compare the degrading
effects of spatial and temporal AN on the eavesdropper’s rate. We
also investigate the power allocation between the data and the AN
and the power allocation between the spatial and the temporal AN.
An upper bound on the secrecy rate loss due to the presence of the
eavesdropper is also derived, and computer simulations are carried
out to demonstrate the performance of our proposed AN scheme.
Index Terms—Fading channels, massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO), MIMO eavesdropper (MIMOME)
channels, secrecy rate, temporal and spatial artificial noise (AN),
wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION secrecy is crucial to a wireless communica-tion system due to the broadcast nature of radio-frequency
transmissions. Traditionally, secrecy is provided by design-
ing upper layer sophisticated protocols and algorithms. More
specifically, the problem of securing the information from
malicious eavesdropping nodes has been tackled by relying
on the conventional encryption mechanism. To improve the
system security, physical (PHY) layer security has been re-
cently recognized as a valuable tool to guarantee information-
theoretic confidentiality of messages transmitted over the
wireless medium.
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Perfect secrecy [1] was introduced as the statistical inde-
pendence between the information bearing message and the
eavesdropper’s observations. The seminal works of Wyner [2]
and Csisza´r and Korner [3] characterized the secrecy capacity
for a wiretap channel as the maximal rate at which information
can be transmitted over the wireless channel while guaranteeing
a vanishing mutual information leakage per channel use. Based
on these works, the secrecy capacity has been investigated for
different channel models and network settings, and more details
can be found in [4]–[11].
In recent years, orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) has been used widely in the PHY layer of most wire-
less and wired communication standards due to its efficiency
in converting frequency-selective fading channels to frequency-
flat fading subchannels, resulting in high performance at practi-
cal complexity. Hence, it is important to investigate PHY-layer
security for OFDM systems. In the information-theoretic se-
curity literature, OFDM has usually been modeled as a set
of parallel Gaussian channels [12]. In [12], Li et al. derived
the secrecy capacity and developed the corresponding power-
allocation schemes for OFDM systems. In [13], the system se-
curity was defined in terms of minimum mean-squared error
at the eavesdropper. In [14], the OFDM wiretap channel was
treated as a special instance of the MIMO wiretap channel, and
its secrecy rates were studied by using both Gaussian inputs and
quadrature amplitude modulation signal constellations through
asymptotic high- and low-signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) analyses.
Recently, many papers studied precoding for PHY-layer se-
curity. For example, linear precoding was studied in [15]–
[20]. In [15], with the full channel state information (CSI)
knowledge at the legitimate transmitter, the authors proposed
a Vandermonde precoding scheme that enables the legitimate
transmitter to transmit the information signal in the null space
of the equivalent eavesdropper multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) channel matrix. In [16], Tsai and Poor investigated
the optimal power-allocation scheme for artificial noise (AN)
secure precoding systems. It was assumed that the legitimate
transmitter has perfect CSI of the link to its legitimate receiver
and knows only the statistics of the potential eavesdropper’s
CSI. In [17], Swindlehurst studied the MIMO wiretap prob-
lem, in which three multiple-antenna nodes share the channel.
The author proposed using enough power to guarantee a certain
quality of service for the legitimate destination measured by
a predefined signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for
successful decoding, and then allocating the remaining power to
generate AN to confuse the eavesdropper. Note that, as explained
in [5], using the constraints of the bit error rate, mean-square
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error, or SINR at eavesdropping nodes does not satisfy either
weak or strong secrecy requirements, but it often simplifies sys-
tem design and analysis.
In [21], Qin et al. proposed temporal AN injection for the
single-input single-output single-antenna eavesdropper OFDM
system, in which a time-domain AN signal is added to the data
signal before transmission. The temporal AN signal is designed
to be canceled at the legitimate receiver prior to data decoding.
It was demonstrated that injecting the AN signal with the data in
the frequency domain is not beneficial, since it degrades the se-
crecy rate. In [22], Akitaya et al. proposed a temporal AN injec-
tion scheme in the time domain for the multiple-input multiple-
output multiantenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) OFDM system.
It was assumed that the precoders are used over the available
subcarriers, which couple the subcarriers and complicates both
encoding and decoding processes at the legitimate nodes.
Both spatial AN-aided (in a non-OFDM system) [16], [17]
and temporal AN-aided [21], [22] PHY-layer security schemes
have been proposed in the literature. However, we are not aware
of any existing work that compares both approaches in terms
of average secrecy rates and implementation feasibility and
complexity. Our goal in this paper is to answer the following
two questions.
1) Under what scenarios is spatial AN preferable over tem-
poral AN and vice versa?
2) Under a total AN average power constraint, is there any
advantage in the average secrecy rate for a hybrid spatial–
temporal AN scheme over a purely temporal or spatial
AN scheme?
To answer these questions, we propose a novel hybrid spatial–
temporal AN-aided PHY-layer security scheme for MIMOME
channels, which is parameterized by the fraction of the total
AN power allocated to each type of AN signals. In addition, we
analyze the average secrecy rate achieved by this hybrid scheme
and derive tight asymptotic bounds on the average secrecy rate
as the number of transmit antennas at the legitimate transmitter
becomes large.
In this paper, we consider a general scenario with a hybrid
spatio-temporal AN injection scheme. In particular, we con-
sider the MIMOME-OFDM wiretap channel, where each node
is equipped with multiple antennas and the legitimate transmitter
(Alice) has perfect knowledge of the CSI for the wireless links
to her legitimate receiver (Bob) only, while the eavesdropper
(Eve) has perfect CSI knowledge of all the links in the network.
This global CSI assumption at Eve represents the best-case sce-
nario for Eve (the worst case for Alice/Bob) since she knows
all the channels between Alice and Bob as well as the used data
and AN precoders at Alice.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
1) We propose a novel hybrid spatial and temporal AN de-
sign. In our proposed scheme, we assume that the data are
encoded in the frequency domain, and then, spatial AN is
added to the precoded data and injected into a direction
orthogonal to the data vector. Prior to each OFDM block
transmission, Alice adds the precoded temporal AN sym-
bols to the signal containing both data and spatial AN to
confuse Eve.
2) We exploit the spatial and temporal degrees of freedom
provided by the available antennas and by the cyclic prefix
(CP) structure of OFDM blocks, respectively, to confuse
Eve, which effectively increase the secrecy rate of the
legitimate system.
3) We derive several new analytic results and insights. We
prove that the average secrecy rate is the same, whether
Alice uses spatial-only AN, temporal-only AN, or a hybrid
AN scheme when the length of CP is much smaller than
the OFDM block size. The asymptotic case with infinite
antennas at Alice is also investigated. We derive the op-
timal power-allocation policy for dynamically assigning
power between the information-bearing signals and the
AN, where the optimal solution for the average secrecy
rate maximization problem is obtained.
4) We show analytically and numerically that Eve can per-
form per-subcarrier decoding instead of computationally
expensive joint decoding without significant reduction in
her rate.
Notation: Unless otherwise stated, lower- and upper-case bold
letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. Lower- and
upper-case letters denote time-domain and frequency-domain
signals, respectively. IN and F denote, respectively, the identity
matrix whose size is N ×N and the fast Fourier transform
(FFT) matrix. CM×N denotes the set of all complex matrices of
size M × N . (·)> and (·)∗ denote transpose and Hermitian (i.e.,
complex-conjugate transpose) operations, respectively. RM×M
denotes the set of real matrices of size M ×M . ‖·‖ denotes the
Euclidean norm of a vector. [·]k,l denotes the (k, l)th entry of a
matrix, and [·]k denotes the kth entry of a vector. The function
min(·, ·) (max(·, ·)) returns the minimum (maximum) among
the values enclosed in brackets. blkdiag(A1, . . . ,Aj , . . . ,AM )
denotes a block diagonal matrix where the enclosed elements are
the diagonal blocks. E[·] denotes statistical expectation. (·)−1
is the inverse of the matrix in brackets. 0 denotes the all-zero
matrix and its size is understood from the context. ⊗ is the
Kronecker product. Trace{·} denotes the sum of the diagonal
entries of enclosed matrix in brackets.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN
A. System Model and Assumptions
The investigated transmission scenario assumes one legiti-
mate transmitter (Alice), one legitimate receiver (Bob), and one
passive eavesdropper (Eve). For each OFDM block, Alice trans-
mits over N orthogonal subcarriers by sending Ns streams per
subcarrier. We assume that the channel matrices remain constant
for the whole transmission duration ofMOFDM blocks, where
M is the coherence time. Alice converts the frequency-domain
signals to time-domain signals using an N -point inverse FFT
(IFFT), and adds a CP of Ncp samples to the head of every
OFDM block. We assume that the CP length is longer than the
delay spreads of all the channels between Alice and Bob to elim-
inate interblock interference at Bob. Moreover, we assume that
the delay spreads of the Alice–Eve channels are shorter than or
equal to the CP length.1 To simplify the analysis in Section III,
1This is a best-case assumption for Eve; otherwise, her rate will be degraded
due to interblock and intrablock interference.
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TABLE I
LIST OF KEY VARIABLES AND THEIR DIMENSIONS
Symbol Description Symbol Description
N # subcarriers N c p CP length
N s # data streams N` # antennas
at Node ` ∈ {A , B , E}
P Average transmit power budget κ` AWGN variance at Node `
Γ` = P /κ` Ratio between P and noise variance x and x˜ 1− x and 1 + x , respectively,
when x is scalar
θ Data power fraction 1− θ AN power fraction
α Spatial AN power fraction 1− α Temporal AN power fraction
σ 2A−B Variance of Alice–Bob channels σ 2A−E Variance of Alice–Eve channels
y ` ∈ CN ` N ×1 Received signal vector PN ` ∈ CN ` N ×N ` N Permutation matrix
at Node `
R c pN `
∈ CN ` N ×N ` (N + N c p ) CP removal matrix at Node ` T c pN ` ∈ C
N ` (N + N c p )×N ` N CP insertion matrix
H˜ ∈ CN B (N + N c p )×N A (N + N c p ) CIR matrix H ∈ CN B N ×N A N Frequency-domain matrix
of Alice–Bob link of Alice–Bob link
G˜ ∈ CN E (N + N c p )×N A (N + N c p ) CIR matrix G ∈ CN E N ×N A N Frequency-domain matrix
of Alice–Eve link of Alice–Eve link
B ∈ CN A N ×(N A −N s )N Overall spatial AN Bk ∈ CN A ×(N A −N s ) Spatial AN precoding matrix
precoding matrix at Subcarrier k
Q ∈ CN A (N + N c p )×(N (N A −N s )+ N c p N A ) Temporal AN precoding matrix A ∈ CN A N ×N s N Overall data precoding matrix
Ak ∈ CN A ×N s Data precoding matrix C∗B ∈ CN s N ×N B N Overall receive filter
at Subcarrier k matrix at Bob
C∗k ∈ CN s ×N B Receive filter matrix of Bob z` AWGN vector at Node `
we assume that all channels have the same delay spread, denoted
by ν. All the channel coefficients are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean circularly symmet-
ric complex Gaussian random variables with variance σ2A−B
for the Alice–Bob links and σ2A−E for the Alice–Eve links, re-
spectively. The channel coefficients between Alice and Bob are
assumed to be known at Alice, Bob, and Eve, and the channel
coefficients between Alice and Eve are assumed to be known
at Eve only. The number of antennas at Node ` ∈ {A, B, E} is
N` . The thermal noise samples at receiving node ` are modeled
as zero-mean complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random
variables with variance κ` Watts/Hz, ` ∈ {B, E}. A description
of the key variables and their dimensions is given in Table I.
B. Proposed Hybrid Spatio-temporal AN-Aided Scheme
To enhance the security of her transmissions, Alice exploits
both the temporal and spatial dimensions provided by the CP
and multiple antennas at both Alice and Bob to generate and
transmit spatial and temporal AN symbols, in order to degrade
the effective channels between Alice and the passive eaves-
dropper. Our proposed hybrid AN-aided transmission scheme
is summarized as follows (see Fig. 1).
1) Alice computes the singular value decomposition (SVD)
of the channel matrix at each subcarrier. Then, she uses
the Ns columns of the right singular vectors of the sub-
carrier channel matrix corresponding to the Ns largest
nonzero singular values to precode the data. The remain-
ing right singular vectors are used to precode the spatial
AN symbols.
2) Alice performs the IFFT on the data-plus-spatial AN vec-
tor and adds the CP.
3) Alice then adds the precoded temporal AN signals to the
data-and-spatial AN time-domain vector.
Fig. 1. Block diagram of our proposed hybrid spatial and temporal AN-aided
scheme.
As explained in the next subsection, the spatial and temporal
AN precoders are designed to ensure that spatial and temporal
AN do not harm to Bob.
Define the data symbol permutation matrix PN` ∈
RN` N×N` N , which rearranges the precoded data symbols trans-
mitted/received over the multiple antennas into OFDM blocks.
Moreover, define the FFT operation at a node with N` an-
tennas as FN` = IN` ⊗ F ∈ CN` N×N` N . In addition, Let ds
= (ds1
>,ds2
>, . . . ,dsN
>)> be the overall spatial AN vector,
and dsk be the injected spatial AN vector over Subcarrier k.
Moreover, let dt be the temporal AN vector. The AN vec-
tors ds and dt are modeled as complex Gaussian random
vectors. As explained in Section II-E, the spatial AN vector
is of dimension NA −Ns and the temporal AN vector is of
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dimension N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA . Hence, by neglecting the
power of the CP symbols added to the data and spatial-AN sig-
nals as in [21] since N is typically much larger than Ncp , the
average transmit power constraint is E{ds∗ds}+ E{dt∗dt}+
E{x∗x} ≤ P , where x = (x>1 ,x>2 , . . . ,x>N )> ∈ CN s N×1 is the
data vector, xk ∈ CN s×1 is the data vector transmitted over Sub-
carrier k, and P is the average transmit power budget at Alice
in Watts/Hz.
Define θP to be the data transmission power; then, we have
E{x∗x} = θP and E{ds∗ds}+ E{dt∗dt} = θP , where θ
= 1− θ. Letting α be the fraction of θP allocated to spatial
AN, then the power allocated to temporal AN is αθP , where
α = 1− α. We assume that the fraction of the power allocated
for data and spatial-AN transmissions over Subcarrier k is 1/N .2
Hence, the power is allocated equally among the subcarriers.
Since Eve’s CSI is unknown at Alice, Alice distributes the
power of the spatial and temporal AN uniformly over their
precoders’ columns. Hence, the power of a spatial AN symbol is
αθP/((N + Ncp)(NA −Ns)) ≈ αθP/(N(NA −Ns)), while
the power of a temporal AN symbol is αθP/(N(NA −Ns) +
NcpNA). Therefore, Alice transmits the following vector:
sA = T
cp
NA
F∗NA PNA (Ax + Bd
s) + Qdt (1)
where PNA ∈ RNA N×NA N is a permutation matrix that rear-
ranges the precoded subcarriers,3 TcpNA ∈ CNA (N +N c p )×NA N is
the CP insertion matrix,Q ∈ CNA (N +N c p )×(N (NA −N s )+N c p NA )
is the temporal AN precoder matrix, and A ∈ CNA N×N s N and
B ∈ CNA N×(NA −N s )N are the data and spatial AN precoders,
respectively.
C. Received Signal Vector at Bob
After applying the linear filter C∗B ∈ CN s N×NB N , the filtered
output vector at Bob is given by
C∗By
B = C∗BP
>
NB
FNB R
cp
NB
H˜sA + C
∗
Bz
B (2)
where yB is the receive signal vector at Bob, and P>NB
is a permutation matrix used by Bob to rearrange the re-
ceived subcarriers. In addition, FNB = blkdiag(F,F, . . . ,F) ∈
CNB N×NB N is the FFT matrix, andRcpNB ∈ CNB N×NB (N +N c p )
is the CP removal matrix used at Bob. Finally, H˜ ∈
CNB (N +N c p )×NA (N +N c p ) is the channel impulse response
(CIR) matrix of the Alice–Bob link, and zB ∈ CNB N×1 is the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at Bob.
The matrix H = P>NB FNB R
cp
NB
H˜TcpNA F
∗
NA
PNA , whose
size is NBN × NAN , is block-diagonal, i.e., H = blkdiag
(H1,H2, . . . ,HN ), where Hk ∈ CNB ×NA is the frequency-
domain channel matrix of the Alice–Bob link at Subcarrier
2The power allocated to a subcarrier for data and spatial-AN transmissions
should be divided by N + Ncp , instead of N . However, in this work, unless
otherwise stated explicitly, we assume that N is much larger than Ncp and,
hence, N + Ncp ≈ N and the power spent in CP transmission is negligible.
3This matrix is used because Alice rearranges the data as a block of Ns
precoded symbols per subcarrier. The multiplication of the permutation matrix
and the precoded data rearranges the data into OFDM blocks, where each
OFDM block consists of N subcarriers. For instance, OFDM block j spans
entries N (j − 1) + 1 to Nj .
k. The data precoding matrix of the kth subcarrier at Al-
ice is denoted by Ak ∈ CNA ×N s , where [Ak ]i,j , for all j,
represents the weights multiplied by the data symbol Xi,k .
Hence, the overall data precoding matrix is denoted by A
= blkdiag(A1,A2, . . . ,AN ) ∈ CNA N×N s N .
The spatial AN precoder matrix of Subcarrier k at Al-
ice is Bk ∈ CNA ×(NA −N s ) , where [Bk ]i,j , for all j, rep-
resents the weights multiplied by the spatial AN symbol
[dsk ]i,1. The overall spatial AN precoding matrix is denoted
byB = blkdiag(B1,B2, . . . ,BN ) ∈ CNA N×(NA −N s )N . More-
over, the receive filter matrix applied at Bob over Subcar-
rier k is denoted by C∗k ∈ CN s×NB . The overall filtering
matrix at Bob, denoted by C∗B ∈ CN s N×NB N , is given by
C∗B = blkdiag(C∗1,C∗2, . . . ,C∗N ).
D. Design of Alice’s Data Precoder Matrix and Bob’s Receive
Filter Matrix
The received signal at Bob after canceling the temporal and
spatial AN vectors is given by
C∗By
B =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
C∗1y
B
1
C∗2y
B
2
.
.
.
C∗N y
B
N
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ = C∗BHAx + C∗BzB
= C∗BP
>
NB
FNB R
cp
NB
H˜TcpNA F
∗
NA
PNA Ax + C
∗
Bz
B
(3)
where yBk ∈ CNB ×1 is the received vector at Subcarrier k and
C∗ky
B
k = C
∗
kHkAkxk + C
∗
kz
B
k .
To maximize the SINR per symbol at Bob, both Alice and
Bob use the SVD of the per-subcarrier channel matrix, Hk
= UkΣkV
∗
k , where Σk contains the singular values, the
columns of Uk are the left-singular vectors of Hk , and the
columns of Vk are the right-singular vectors of Hk . Hence, Al-
ice selects the data precoding matrix Ak to be the Ns columns
of Vk and Ck to be the Ns columns of Uk , which correspond
to the Ns largest nonzero singular values of Hk .
E. Design of Alice’s Temporal and Spatial AN Precoders
Our aim is to cancel the spatial and temporal AN at Bob.
From (2), the condition to cancel the spatial-AN vector at Bob
is given by
C∗BHB = 0⇔ C∗kHkBk = 0 ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (4)
Given C∗k , Alice designs the spatial AN precoding matrix Bk
to lie in the null space of C∗kHk ∈ CN s×NA which is non-
trivial only if NA > Ns . If this condition is not satisfied (i.e.,
NA = Ns), Alice will not be able to inject any spatial AN. The
spatial AN precoding matrix is designed to make the AN lie in
the subspace spanned by the remaining vectors of Vk . That is,
Alice combines the remaining NA −Ns columns of Vk using
Gaussian random variables each with zero mean and variance
αθP/(N(NA −Ns)).
After designing the data and spatial AN linear precoders and
receive filters, Alice designs the temporal AN precoder matrix
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Q, based on the knowledge of the receive filter at Bob, according
to the following condition:
C∗BP
>
NB
FNB R
cp
NB
H˜Q = 0 (5)
where Q lies in the null space of C∗BP>NB FNB R
cp
NB
H˜, which
has a dimension of NsN × NA(N + Ncp). The condition to
cancel the temporal AN vector at Bob is given by
NA(N + Ncp) > NsN ⇒ (1 + Ncp
N
) >
Ns
NA
. (6)
This condition is always satisfied since NA ≥ Ns . In
Appendix A, we show how Alice can compute Q efficiently
using the properties of the Toeplitz matrix RcpNB H˜.
F. Received Signal Vector at Eve
Since Eve has NE receive antennas, her received signal vector
is given by
yE = P>NE FNE R
cp
NE
G˜sA + z
E (7)
where yE ∈ CNE N×1 is the received signal vector at Eve,
FNE ∈ CNE N×NE N is the FFT operation performed at Eve,
RcpNE ∈ CNE N×NE (N +N c p ) is the CP removal matrix used at
Eve, G˜ ∈ CNE (N +N c p )×NA (N +N c p ) is the CIR matrix of the
Alice–Eve link, and zE ∈ CNE N×1 is the AWGN vector at Eve’s
receiver.
The per-subcarrier received signal vector at Eve, denoted by
yEk ∈ CNE×1, is given by
yEk = Gk (Akxk + Bkd
s
k ) + Ekd
t + zEk (8)
where Gk is the frequency-domain channel matrix at Subcarrier
k of the Alice–Eve link, zEk are rows (k − 1)NE + 1 to kNE of
the AWGN vector zE , and Ek consists of the NE rows from
(k − 1)NE + 1 to kNE of matrix E = P>NE FNE RcpNE G˜Q.
We define the frequency-domain block-diagonal matrix of the
Alice–Eve link as G = blkdiag(G1,G2, . . . ,GN ).
III. AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
Our goal in this section is to derive closed-form expres-
sions for the average secrecy rate. Assume that the received
signal vector at Node `2 due to a transmission from Node `1,
where `1, `2 ∈ {A,B,E}, is r + j + z`2 , where r is the received
weighted data vector, z`2 is the AWGN vector at Node `2, and j
is a Gaussian interference vector. The instantaneous rate of the
`1 − `2 link is [16], [23]
R`1−`2 = log2 det
(
Σr
[
E
{(
j + z`2
) (
j + z`2
)∗}]−1
+ IN` 2
)
(9)
where Σr = E{rr∗} is the data weighted covariance matrix and
E
{(
j + z`2
) (
j + z`2
)∗} is the noise-plus-interference covari-
ance matrix.
Define the input SNRs of the Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve links
as ΓB = P/κB and ΓE = P/κE , respectively. Assuming that
the transmit power is allocated equally among the Ns indepen-
dent data symbols, and using (3) and (9), the rate at Bob, denoted
by RA−B , is given by
RA−B = log2 det (θΓBC
∗
BHAΣx (C
∗
BHA)
∗ + IN s N )
=
N∑
k=1
log2 det (θΓBC
∗
kHkAkΣxk (C
∗
kHkAk )
∗ + IN s )
(10)
where θPΣx is the data covariance matrix with Σx =
1
N s (N +N c p )
IN s N ≈ 1N s N IN s N and Σxk ≈ 1N s N IN s .
We consider and compare two decoding approaches at Eve.
In the first approach, she decodes the signals on all the subcar-
riers jointly by taking into account the correlation among the
subcarriers due to the temporal AN. In the second approach, Eve
decodes the signals at each subcarrier separately assuming that
each subcarrier is a MIMO channel. If Eve performs joint pro-
cessing across all of her subcarriers, using (7), her rate, denoted
by RA−E , is given by4
RA−E = log2 det
(
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗ (ΣAN + INE N )
−1
+ INE N
)
(11)
where
ΣAN = θΓE
(
αGBB∗G∗
N(NA −Ns) +
αEE∗
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA
)
.
(12)
The eavesdropper’s rate expression in (11) assumes that Eve
knows the channels between Alice and Bob, and hence, she
knows the used data and AN precoders by Alice. This assump-
tion represents a best-case scenario for Eve.
Proposition 1: When 1− N sNA 
N c p
N , Eve’s rate and the se-
crecy rate are independent of α.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
If Eve performs per-subcarrier processing due to its reduced
complexity, her rate is given by
RA−E =
N∑
k=1
[
log2 det
(
θΓEGkAkΣxk
(
GkAk
)∗
×
(
ΣAN ,k + INE
)−1
+ INE
)]
(13)
where
ΣAN ,k = θΓE
(
αGkBkB
∗
kG
∗
k
N(NA −Ns) +
αEkE
∗
k
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA
)
.
(14)
The secrecy rate of the legitimate system is given by [5], [16],
[25], [26]
Rsec = (RA−B −RA−E)+ (15)
4This expression represents the best rate for Eve which will be reduced if Eve
applies a linear filter such as MMSE or zero-forcing filters as in [24].
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where (·)+ = max(·, 0). The average secrecy rate of the legiti-
mate system is approximately given by [16], [25], [26]
E{Rsec} = E {RA−B} − E {RA−E} . (16)
The average secrecy rate loss due to eavesdropping, which rep-
resents the reduction in the average secrecy rate due to the
presence of an eavesdropper (i.e., the difference between the
secrecy rate of the Alice–Bob link and the achievable rate of
the Alice–Bob link without eavesdropping), denoted by SLoss ,
is given by
SLoss = RA−B ,noEve −Rsec (17)
where RA−B ,noEve is the achievable rate at Bob when there is
no Eve.
The following relation is useful in our secrecy rate
derivations:
GkG
∗
k = GkAk (GkAk )
∗ + GkBk (GkBk )∗ (18)
where the columns of Ak are the Ns right singular vectors
corresponding to the largest nonzero singular values of Hk and
the columns of Bk are the remaining NA −Ns right singular
vectors of Hk . Equation (18) can be easily obtained by first
noting that AkA∗k + BkB∗k = INA , since the columns of Ak
and Bk form orthonormal bases. Then, (18) is obtained by left
and right multiplication by Gk and G∗k , respectively.
In the following subsection, we investigate the asymptotic
average secrecy rate of MIMOME-OFDM systems as NA
→∞. We derive a lower-bound on the average secrecy rate
as well as the average secrecy rate loss due to eavesdropping.
Moreover, we investigate the asymptotic scenarios of low and
high SNRs at sufficiently large NA .
A. Asymptotic Average Rates in MIMOME-OFDM Channels
In this subsection, we investigate the asymptotic case of
NA →∞. Wireless base stations with large numbers of trans-
mit antennas, which are also known as massive MIMO systems,
have attracted considerable research attention recently (see, e.g.,
[27] and [28] and the references therein). It is important to point
out that massive MIMO is a key-enabling technology for emerg-
ing 5G communication networks.
For MIMOME-OFDM systems, Eve’s rate when NA is very
large is given by
RA−E ≈ log2 det
(
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗ (ΣAN + INE N )
−1
+ INE N
) (19)
where
ΣAN ≈
θΓE
(
α
N(NA −Ns)GG
∗ +
α
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA EE
∗
)
.
(20)
Note that we used the fact that BB∗ ≈ IN (NA −N s ) and QQ∗
≈ INA (N +N c p ) as NA →∞. To analyze the average secrecy
rate, we need the statistics of P>NE FNE R
cp
NE
G˜, GkAkA
∗
kG
∗
k ,
and HkAkA∗kH∗k , which are derived in Appendixes C and D.
Proposition 2: As NA →∞ and when 1− N sNA 
N c p
N ,
Eve’s rate is independent of α and is given by
RA−E ≈ log2 det
(
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗
×
(
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)GG
∗ + INE N
)−1
+ INE N
)
.
(21)
In addition, the secrecy rate is given by
Rsec ≈
N∑
k=1
log2 det (θΓBC
∗
kHkAkΣxk (C
∗
kHkAk )
∗ + IN s )
− log2 det
(
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗
×
(
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)GG
∗ + INE N
)−1
+ INE N
)
.
(22)
Proof: See Appendix E. 
Proposition 3: As NA →∞ and when 1− N sNA 
N c p
N , per-
subcarrier processing at Eve achieves the same rate as that
achieved with joint subcarrier processing. Hence, the average
secrecy rate is given by
Rsec≈
N∑
k=1
(
log2 det (θΓBC
∗
kHkAkΣxk (C
∗
kHkAk )
∗+IN s )
− log2 det
(
θΓEGkAkΣxk (GkAk )
∗
×
(
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)GkG
∗
k + INE
)−1
+ INE
))
. (23)
Proof: See Appendix F. 
Proposition 4: As NA →∞, the average secrecy rate for
the MIMOME-OFDM system in bits/s/Hz is lower bounded as
follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
− NEN
N + Ncp
log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜σ2A−E
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
+ 1
+ 1
⎞⎠
(24)
where ν˜ = ν + 1.
Proof: See Appendix G. 
The average secrecy rate in (24) is concave in α. It is maxi-
mized when the denominator of the second term is minimized.
The average secrecy rate maximization problem is simplified
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after removing the terms independent of α as follows:
min
0≤α≤1
θΓE
N ν˜σ
2
A−E
θΓE ν˜σ2A−E
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
+ 1
⇒ max
0≤α≤1
α
N
+
α
N + Ncp
. (25)
Since Ncp/N  1, we can approximate N + Ncp by N . Hence,
the second term in (24) becomes independent of α, which im-
plies that α can take any value from 0 to 1 without reducing the
average secrecy rate.
Remark 1: The lower-bound in (24) holds only when NA is
sufficiently large so that our use of the law of large numbers is
accurate. When NA is not sufficiently large, the bound in (24)
should be considered as an approximation.
Proposition 5: As NA →∞, Eve’s average rate when she
performs per-subcarrier processing is upper bounded as follows:
E{RA−E ,k} /
NE log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜σ2A−E
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
+ 1
+ 1
⎞⎠ . (26)
In addition, the average secrecy rate of the legitimate system is
lower-bounded as follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
− NEN
N + Ncp
log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜σ2A−E
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
+ 1
+ 1
⎞⎠ .
(27)
Proof: Following the same steps as those used to prove
Proposition 4, we can prove Proposition 5. 
Proposition 6: When NA →∞ and for high ΓBσ2A−B
≥ ΓEσ2A−E and high ΓEσ2A−E , the average secrecy rate for
MIMOME-OFDM systems can be lower bounded as follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
+
NEN
N + Ncp
log2
((
NE
NE + Ns
) N s
N E
(
Ns
NE + Ns
))
(28)
when Alice uses the power allocation
θ = θ? =
NE
NE + Ns
. (29)
Proof: See Appendix H. 
Proposition 6 suggests that when the number of transmit an-
tennas at Alice, NA , is large and the SNR is high, the optimal
power allocated for data transmission to maximize the average
secrecy rate is a function of the number of antennas at Eve and
the number of data streams at Alice.
Corollary 1: As NA →∞ and for high ΓBσ2A−B
≥ ΓEσ2A−E and high ΓEσ2A−E , the average secrecy rate loss due
to eavesdropping, denoted by E{SLoss}, in MIMOME-OFDM
systems can be upper bounded by
E{SLoss} / NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
NE + Ns
NE
)
+
NEN
N + Ncp
log2
(
NE + Ns
Ns
) (30)
when Alice uses the power allocation
θ = θ? =
NE
NE + Ns
. (31)
Proof: See Appendix H. 
Remark 2: From (29), in the high-SNR regime, the optimal
power-allocation policy between the data and the AN depends
only on the number of receive antennas at Eve and the number
of transmitted data streams at Alice. Hence, Alice can optimize
θ that maximizes her average secrecy rate without the need to
know the CSI of Eve. If NE = Ns , the optimal power-allocation
policy is to set θ to 1/2. This implies that the optimal power-
allocation policy for Alice is to split her transmit power equally
between the data symbols and the AN symbols. If NE  Ns ,
θ? = 1, which means that all of Alice’s transmit power should be
assigned for data transmission to maximize the average secrecy
rate, and there is no need to waste power on transmitting AN.
Note that if Eve’s number of receive antennas is unknown at
Alice, Alice can select a value for θ and operate under this
assumption. When Alice does not know any information about
Eve, a reasonable value for θ is θ = 1/2.
Remark 3: If NE  Ns , the first term of the right-hand side
in (30) is approximately zero. Hence
E{SLoss} / NEN
N + Ncp
log2
(
NE + Ns
Ns
)
≈ NEN
N + Ncp
log2
(
NE
Ns
)
. (32)
Proposition 7: For NE = Ns , NA →∞ and for high
ΓBσ
2
A−B ≥ ΓEσ2A−E and high ΓEσ2A−E , the average rate loss
due to eavesdropping in MIMOME-OFDM systems can be up-
per bounded as follows:
E{SLoss} / 2NEN
N + Ncp
. (33)
Proof: Substituting with Ns = NE into (30), we obtain
(33). 
Proposition 8: As NA →∞, ΓBσ2A−B ≥ ΓEσ2A−E , and for
low ΓEσ2A−E , the average secrecy rate loss due to eavesdropping
in MIMOME-OFDM systems is upper-bounded as follows:
E{SLoss} / NEN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
(34)
when Alice uses the power-allocation policy θ = θ? = 1.
Proof: See Appendix I. 
Proposition 8 suggests that when the number of transmit an-
tennas at Alice is large and the SNR is low, AN injection slightly
affects the average secrecy rate. Thus, Alice should allocate all
of her power to data transmission (i.e., θ = 1).
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Fig. 2. Average secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz versus NE for different values
of NA .
Remark 4: From (89) in Appendix I, when NE = Ns = NB ,
the average secrecy rate is lower-bounded as follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
− NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
.
(35)
Since NA > Ns and NA →∞, we have
log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
 log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
.
(36)
Consequently, (35) is approximately given by
E{Rsec} ' NsN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
= E{RA−B ,noEve}.
(37)
From (37) and given that E{RA−B ,noEve} ≥ E{Rsec}, we con-
clude that at low input power levels and for a large number
of transmit antennas at Alice, the average secrecy rate loss is
negligible.
B. Temporal AN Versus Spatial AN
We conclude this section by comparing the pros and cons of
spatial and temporal AN for MIMOME-OFDM systems.
1) Since Alice encodes the data on each subcarrier individ-
ually, and the received signals at different subcarriers at
Bob are independent, Bob can perform per-subcarrier pro-
cessing of the received signals without loss of optimality.
On the other hand, due to the presence of the tempo-
ral AN, which couples the signals at different subcarriers
(i.e., results in a correlated noise vector at Eve’s receiver),
Eve’s optimal detection strategy should be based on joint
processing on the received subcarriers. However, in our
numerical results, Eve’s rate loss due to per-sub-carrier
processing is not significant for the considered scenar-
ios, as shown in Fig. 3. This demonstrates the benefits
of injecting the temporal AN to increase the decoding
complexity at Eve.
Fig. 3. Average secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz versus θ for different antenna
configurations.
Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz versus α.
2) When NA = Ns , the dimension of the AN vector is zero.
Hence, spatial AN cannot be applied, and Alice can only
apply temporal AN to confuse Eve.
3) The implementation complexity of spatial AN is lower
than that of temporal AN. More specifically, the spatial
AN precoder is implemented using the SVD of the N per-
subcarrier matrices, where the dimension of each subcar-
rier matrix is Ns × NA . Hence, the complexity of com-
puting the overall spatial AN precoder matrixB is linear in
N and cubic in Ns and NA . On the other hand, the tempo-
ral AN design requires the computation of the null space
of a large matrix whose size is NNs × (N + Ncp)NA ,
which is cubic in N .
4) Temporal AN injection increases the encoding complexity
at Alice as well as the decoding complexity at Eve. On
the other hand, spatial AN injection decreases complexity
at both nodes. However, since Eve does not know exactly
which AN Alice is injecting in her transmissions, Alice
might use the spatial AN scheme, while Eve performs
joint subcarrier processing.
5) Given that both schemes provide comparable average se-
crecy rates as proved in Proposition 1 and demonstrated
numerically in Fig. 4, Alice can inject the spatial-only
AN to reduce the system design complexity. However,
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spatial AN cannot be implemented when NA = Ns . We
emphasize here that our proposed null space computation
technique in Appendix A, which is used to compute the
temporal AN precoding matrix, reduces the null space
computation complexity and can increase the randomness
at Eve since Alice can use random matrices in her design.
Thus, we conjecture that temporal AN injection can fur-
ther increase the secrecy rate using a randomized temporal
AN precoder matrix.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the average secrecy rate of our
proposed hybrid spatial–temporal AN-aided scheme. We use
the following common parameters: ν = Ncp = 16, N = 64,
ΓB = ΓE = 20 dB, and σ2A−B = σ2A−E = 1. Fig. 2 shows the
impact of the number of antennas at Eve on the average secrecy
rate. The parameters used to generate the figure are the common
parameters and θ = α = 0.5. As NE increases, Eve can better
mitigate the impact of the AN, and hence, the average secrecy
rate decreases. When NE is large enough, Eve can always de-
code Alice’s data reliably, and hence, the secrecy rate is zero.
This figure also quantifies the impact of NA on the average
secrecy rate. For example, when NE = 4, the average secrecy
rate is increased from 0 to 2 bits/s/Hz as NA increases from
2 to 4.
Fig. 3 quantifies two important aspects: 1) the impact of the
power fraction assigned to information-bearing signal θ on the
average secrecy rate and 2) the accuracy of our proposed approx-
imations and bounds. The parameters used to generate the figure
are the common parameters and α = 0.5. As the power fraction
increases, the average secrecy rate increases till it achieves a
maximum; then, it decreases till it achieves the zero secrecy
rate since there is no sufficient power to transmit information-
bearing signal. If Eve’s CSI is known at Alice, she can optimize
over θ for each OFDM block to maximize the instantaneous
secrecy rate. If the statistics of the Alice–Eve links are known at
Alice, she can optimize θ to maximize the average secrecy rate.
However, if Alice has no information about Eve’s channels, she
chooses a value for θ and operates under this assumption.
When NA is very large, as shown in Section III-A, the opti-
mal θ depends on the number of transmit data streams at Alice
and the number of receive antennas at Eve. Hence, Alice just
needs to know the number of receive antennas at Eve to ad-
just θ such that the average secrecy rate is maximized. For
Ns = NB = NE = 2 and NA = 10, per-subcarrier processing
achieves the same average secrecy rate as that of joint subcarrier
processing. This means that Eve can reduce the decoding com-
plexity at her receiver by employing per-subcarrier processing.
On the other hand, for the scenario of Ns = NB = 2, NE = 4,
and NA = 3, joint processing increases Eve’s rate and, hence,
decreases the secrecy rate of the legitimate system. We empha-
size here that if Alice does not know the CSI of the Alice–Eve
links or their statistics, she cannot optimize θ to maximize her
own secrecy rate. However, a good approximation to the optimal
θ is given by (81), e.g., θ? = NE/(NE + Ns) = 1/2 is optimal
for NA = 10 and NA = 20. Eve can still decide to perform per-
subcarrier processing even if she achieves a lower rate to reduce
the decoding complexity since the secrecy rate loss is not high in
many scenarios. Furthermore, since we assume the worst-case
scenario, in which Eve knows all channels and precoder matri-
ces, Eve can choose the best decoding strategy for her. Based
on our extensive simulations, we conjecture that per-subcarrier
processing at Eve achieves a comparable rate as joint processing
when NA > NE . When NA = 20, our proposed lower-bound on
the average secrecy rate is tight for low θ levels. When θ is near
unity, our proposed lower-bound is close to the exact average
secrecy rate. Fig. 3 reveals that if Alice allocates all her power
to the data (i.e., θ = 1), the average secrecy rate may approach
zero as in the scenario of Ns = NB = 2, NE = 4, and NA = 3.
This demonstrates the benefits of AN injection.
Fig. 4 demonstrates the impact of the transmit power dis-
tribution between the spatial and temporal AN on the average
secrecy rate. This figure is generated using the common pa-
rameters: θ = 0.5, NB = Ns , and NE = 2. We plot the average
secrecy rate by varying α, which is the fraction of the AN power
allocated to the spatial AN. This figure also shows the secrecy
rate increase with the numbers of transmit antennas at Alice and
receive antennas at Bob. The impact of α is relatively small and
the secrecy rate versus α is almost flat. The benefit of increasing
the number of transmit antennas is evident since the secrecy rate
is almost doubled when NA is doubled. The figure also demon-
strates the tightness of our proposed lower-bound. The bound
completely coincides with the exact value when NA = 20 and
Ns = 2. For NA = 10 and Ns = 2, the bound is very close to
the exact value and the gap is less than 5%.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid spatio-temporal AN-aided
scheme to secure a MIMOME-OFDM system in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper. We assumed that Eve’s CSI is un-
known at the legitimate nodes. We analyzed the nodes’ rates,
system’s secrecy rate, and system’s average secrecy rate and de-
rived lower-bounds on the secrecy rate of the MIMOME-OFDM
systems when the number of transmit antennas at Alice, NA , is
very large. When NA is sufficiently large, closed-form solutions
for the optimal power allocation between the AN and data and
between the temporal and spatial AN were obtained from these
bounds at high and low average SNRs.
In the low-SNR regime, Alice should not allocate power to
AN, and hence, all Alice’s transmit power is allocated to data
transmission. The corresponding average secrecy rate loss due
to the presence of an eavesdropper is negligible. In the high-SNR
regime, Alice should allocate θ? = NE/(NE + Ns) of her total
power for information transmission and the remaining power for
AN transmission. If NE = Ns , in the high average SNR regime,
Alice should allocate half of her total power to AN transmission
and the other half to data transmission. The corresponding
average secrecy rate loss due to the presence of an eavesdropper
is 2/(N + Ncp) bits/s/Hz, which is linearly decreasing with the
OFDM block size N . In addition, we numerically demonstrated
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that this power allocation solution θ? = NE/(NE + Ns) is
also a good approximation for the case with a small NA and
can be used without knowledge of the Alice–Eve links CSI at
Alice. Furthermore, we showed that the average secrecy rate
is independent of α for Ncp/N  1−Ns/NA . In addition,
we showed that Eve can perform per-subcarrier decoding
instead of joint decoding without significant reduction in her
rate.
APPENDIX A
TEMPORAL AN PRECODER MATRIX DESIGN AND
EFFICIENT COMPUTATION
In this Appendix, we design the temporal AN precoder matrix
Q for the case NA ≥ NB = Ns . From (5), the condition to
cancel the temporal AN at Bob when NB = Ns becomes
C∗BP
>
NB
FNB R
cp
NB
H˜Q = 0⇒ RcpNB H˜Q = 0 (38)
since the matrices C∗B , P>NB , and FNB are square unitary when
NB = Ns . The matrix H˜toep = RcpNB H˜ in (5) and (38) is a
block-Toeplitz matrix whose (i, j) block is the Toeplitz matrix
H˜i,j , which represents the CIR matrix of the i− j link. The
matrix H˜i,j ∈ C(N +N c p )×(N +N c p ) can be split into two blocks.
The first block, denoted by H˜1i,j , is N × N , while the second
block, denoted by H˜2i,j , has a size of N × Ncp . The determinant
of H˜1i,j is aN (where a is the diagonal element of the Toeplitz
upper-triangular matrix H˜1i,j ), and hence, it is a full-rank matrix.
Starting with the special case of NA = NB = 1, the matrix
H˜toepQ is given by
H˜toepQ =
(
H˜11,1 H˜
2
1,1
)(Q1
Q2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Q
(39)
where the sizes of Q1 and Q2 are N × Ncp and Ncp × Ncp ,
respectively. The condition to cancel the AN at Bob is
H˜toepQ = 0⇒ Q1 = −
(
H˜11,1
)−1
H˜21,1Q2. (40)
Hence, Alice can randomly generate Q2 and compute Q1 from
(40). Since the matrix H˜11,1 in (40) is an N × N Toeplitz matrix,
when N is large, we can approximate it by a circulant matrix
[29], which reduces its inversion complexity significantly by
applying the FFT operation. After computing Q1 and Q2,
we apply the Gram–Schmidt procedure on the columns of
Q
= (Q>1 ,Q
>
2 )
> to make it an orthonormal-column matrix.
If Q2 is generated to have zero-mean i.i.d. complex Gaussian
entries with unit variance, Q1 becomes a matrix with complex
zero-mean Gaussian entries.
When Alice has NA > 1 antennas and Bob has only one
antenna, i.e., NB = Ns = 1 antenna, the condition to cancel the
AN signal at Bob becomes
H˜toepQ =
NA∑
i=1
H˜11,iQ2i+1 +
NA∑
i=1
H˜21,iQ2i = 0
H˜11,jQ2j+1 = −
NA∑
i=1
i 6=j
H˜11,iQ2i+1 −
NA∑
i=1
H˜21,iQ2i
Q2j+1 = −
(
H˜11,j
)−1 ⎛⎜⎝NA∑
i=1
i 6=j
H˜11,iQ2i+1 +
NA∑
i=1
H˜21,iQ2i
⎞⎟⎠
(41)
where Q = (Q>1 ,Q>2 , . . . ,Q>2NA )
>
. From (41), which holds for
any j, we notice that Alice can randomly generate Qi , for all
i 6= 2j + 1, and then obtain Q2j+1 from (41) where the inverse
of the Toeplitz matrix H˜11,j is computed approximately using the
FFT to reduce computational complexity. Finally, Alice applies
the Gram–Schmidt procedure on the columns of Q to make it
an orthonormal-column matrix.
IfNB > 1, Alice stacksNs matrices of sizeN × N in a single
bigger matrix of size NsN × NsN . As an example, consider
the case of NB = Ns = 2, where we have
H˜toepQ =
(
H˜11,1 H˜
2
1,1 H˜
1
1,2 H˜
2
1,2 . . . H˜
1
1,NA H˜
2
1,NA
H˜12,1 H˜
2
2,1 H˜
1
2,2 H˜
2
2,2 . . . H˜
1
2,NA H˜
2
2,NA
)
×
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
.
.
.
Q2NA
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0
=
(
H˜11,1 H˜
1
1,2
H˜12,1 H˜
1
2,2
)(
Q1
Q3
)
+
(
H˜21,1 H˜
2
1,2 . . . H˜
1
1,NA H˜
2
1,NA
H˜22,1 H˜
2
2,2 . . . H˜
1
2,NA H˜
2
2,NA
)
×
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Q2
Q4
Q5
.
.
.
Q2NA −1
Q2NA
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= 0.
(42)
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The matrix
(
H˜11,1 H˜
1
1,2
H˜12,1 H˜
1
2,2
)
is invertible since its determinant is
equal to det
(
H˜11,1H˜
1
2,2 − H˜11,2
(
H˜12,2
)−1
H˜12,1H˜
1
2,2
)
which is
nonzero. This is due to the fact that the matrix H˜11,1H˜12,2 −
H˜11,2
(
H˜12,2
)−1
H˜12,1H˜
1
2,2 is an upper-triangular matrix with
complex Gaussian random entries, and hence, it is full rank.5
Rearranging (42), we get(
Q1
Q3
)
= −
(
H˜11,1 H˜
1
1,2
H˜12,1 H˜
1
2,2
)−1
×
(
H˜21,1 H˜
2
1,2 . . . H˜
1
1,NA H˜
2
1,NA
H˜22,1 H˜
2
2,2 . . . H˜
1
2,NA H˜
2
2,NA
)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Q2
Q4
Q5
.
.
.
Q2NA −1
Q2NA
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (43)
Alice generates Qi , for all i /∈ {1, 3}, randomly and calculates
Q1 and Q3 using (43). We can generalize the above approach
for any NB at Bob.
Remark 5: Although our proposed algorithm for the null
space computation of a Toeplitz upper-triangular matrix has
the ability to randomly generate the columns of the temporal
AN precoder matrix, which implies that Eve cannot possibly
know the precoder, we still assume that Eve can estimate it.
This represents the best-case scenario for Eve and gives her an
unrealistic ability to know the precoder.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In this Appendix, we prove that Eve’s rate and the
secrecy rate are independent of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 by showing
that when Ncp/N  1−Ns/NA , the eigenvalues of the
interference-plus-noise covariance matrix, denoted by ΣAN
in (12), do not depend on α. Starting from (4) and (5), de-
fine XH˜ = C∗BP>NB FNB RcpNB H˜. Hence, we can rewrite the
terms in (4) and (5) as C∗BHB = XH˜TcpNA F∗NA PNA B and
C∗BP
>
NB
FNB R
cp
NB
H˜Q = XH˜Q. When Ncp/N  1, the CP in-
sertion and removal matrices are approximately identity matri-
ces. Hence, the spatial AN cancellation condition in (4) can be
rewritten as
XH˜ Bˆ = 0 (44)
where Bˆ = TcpNA F
∗
NA
PNA B is an orthonormal-column ma-
trix. The temporal AN cancellation condition in (5) can be
5We used the facts that 1) the inverse of an upper triangular matrix is another
upper triangular matrix [30] and that 2) the multiplication of two upper triangular
matrices is also an upper-triangular matrix [31].
rewritten as
XH˜Q = 0. (45)
Since the columns of Q form an orthonormal basis for the null
space of XH˜ and the columns of Bˆ are orthonormal and they lie
in the null space of XH˜ , every column in Bˆ can be written as a
linear combination of the columns of Q. Hence
QL = Bˆ (46)
where L ∈ C(N (NA −N s )+N c p NA )×N (NA −N s ) is a linear trans-
formation matrix. Since Q∗Q = IN (NA −N s )+N c p NA and Bˆ∗Bˆ
= IN (NA −N s ) , we have
L∗Q∗QL = Bˆ∗Bˆ = IN (NA −N s ) . (47)
Consequently
L∗L = IN (NA −N s ) . (48)
This implies that L is an orthonormal-column matrix. Substi-
tuting (46) into (12), we have
ΣAN = θΓEXG˜
(
αQLL∗Q∗
N(NA −Ns)
+
αQQ∗
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA
)
X∗
G˜
= θΓEXG˜Q
(
α
N(NA −Ns)LL
∗
+
α
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA IN (NA −N s )+N c p NA
)
Q∗X ∗
G˜
(49)
where XG˜ = P>NE FNE RcpNE G˜. Since Ncp/N  1, we have
ΣAN =
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)D
(
αLL∗ + αIN (NA −N s )+N c p NA
)
D∗
(50)
where D = XG˜Q. Define the SVD of L as L
= ULΛLV
∗
L , where the columns of UL are the left
singular vectors of L, ΛL = blkdiag(IN (NA −N s ) ,0) ∈
C(N (NA −N s )+N c p NA )×(N (NA −N s )+N c p NA ) is the diagonal
matrix containing the singular values, and VL are the right
singular vectors of L. Thus
ΣAN =
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)
× D (αULΛ2LU∗L + αIN (NA −N s )+N c p NA )D∗.
(51)
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By replacing IN (NA −N s )+N c p NA in (51) with ULU∗L , and since
Λ2L = ΛL , (51) is rewritten as
ΣAN =
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)D (αULΛLU
∗
L + αULU
∗
L)D
∗
=
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)DUL
× (αΛL + αIN (NA −N s )+N c p NA )U∗LD∗
= θΓEDUL
M
N(NA −Ns)U
∗
LD
∗ (52)
where M=αΛL +αIN (NA−N s )+N c p NA =blkdiag(IN (NA−N s) ,
αIN c p NA ). When the dimension of the matrix IN (NA −N s ) is
much greater than the dimension of the matrix αIN c p NA , we
can ignore the matrix αIN c p NA . The condition is thus given by
Ncp/N  1−Ns/NA . In this case, the variation of ΣAN with
α is negligible which makes Eve’s rate almost flat with α. Since
the achievable rates at Bob and Eve are independent of α, the
secrecy rate is also independent of α.
APPENDIX C
DISTRIBUTION OF FNE G˜toep
In this Appendix, we derive the distribution of fkG˜toep and
‖fkG˜toep‖2, where G˜toep = RcpNE G˜ and fk is the kth row of
FNE . Since the matrix G˜toep is a block Toeplitz matrix whose
(i, j) block, denoted by G˜i,j , is the CIR of the i− j link, and
is an upper-triangular Teoplitz matrix with first row equal to
(a˜, b˜, . . . , 0, . . . , 0). This matrix G˜ij ∈ C(N +N c p )×(N +N c p ) has
the following properties.
1) Each row has (ν + 1) nonzero circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random variables.
2) The `th column, ` ≤ ν, has ` nonzero complex Gaussian
entries. The nonzero entries are i.i.d. circuitry-symmetric
complex Gaussian.
3) Each column from (ν + 1) to N has ν + 1 nonzero com-
plex Gaussian entries.
4) Column (N + k) has (ν − k + 1) nonzero entries. Fi-
nally, column (N + ν) has only 1 nonzero complex Gaus-
sian entry and the other entries are zero.
The above structure is repeated each N + ν columns and
rows of G˜toep . The random vector fkG˜toep is composed of en-
tries which follow complex Gaussian distribution with different
means and variances based on the structure of G˜toep . Assuming
that Ns = NB = NE = 1 as in the MISOSE-OFDM case, the
jth entry of the random vector fkG˜toep is given by
[fkG˜toep ]1,j =
N∑
i=1
[fk ]1,i
[
G˜toep
]
i,j
(53)
with |[fk ]1,i |2 = 1/N for all i. The jth entry of fkG˜toep ,
[fkG˜toep ]1,j , is a complex Gaussian distributed random
variable with zero mean and variance
σ2j =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ2A−E
N
j, if j ≤ ν
σ2A−E
N
(ν + 1), if ν + 1 ≤ j ≤ N
σ2A−E
N
(ν − k + 1), if j ≥ N + k,∀1 ≤ k ≤ ν
(54)
where j ≤ N + ν. Using (54), the random variable ‖fkG˜toep‖2
has a mean of
E{‖fkG˜toep‖2} =
(
2
σ2A−E
N
+ 2(2)
σ2A−E
N
+ 2(3)
σ2A−E
N
+ . . .
+ 2(ν)
σ2A−E
N
+ (N − ν)ν˜ σ
2
A−E
N
)
NA
=
(
2
σ2A−E
N
ν∑
m=1
m + (N − ν)ν˜ σ
2
A−E
N
)
NA
=
(
2
σ2A−E
N
νν˜
2
+ (N − ν)ν˜ σ
2
A−E
N
)
NA
= σ2A−E ν˜NA (55)
since
∑ν
m=1 m =
ν (ν+1)
2 =
ν ν˜
2 . Using the law of large numbers
when NA →∞, ‖fkG˜toep‖2 is approximately given by
‖fkG˜toep‖2 ≈ σ2A−E ν˜NA (56)
APPENDIX D
DISTRIBUTIONS OF GkAkA∗kG∗k AND HkAkA∗kH∗k
In this Appendix, we derive an analytic expression for the dis-
tribution of ‖[GkAk ]i,j‖2. The (i, j)th element of Gk , [Gk ]i,j ,
is given by
[Gk ]i,j = g0,i,j +
ν∑
`=1
g`,i,jω
`k (57)
where ω = exp
(−2π√−1/N), g`,i,j is the `th tap of the CIR
of the (i, j)th Alice–Eve channel. Since g`,i,j follows an i.i.d.
Gaussian distribution, g0,i,j +
∑ν
`=1 g`,i,jω
lk is also Gaussian
distributed with zero mean and variance
E{[Gk ]i,j [Gk ]∗i,j}
= E
{(
g0,i,j +
ν∑
`=1
g`,i,jω
`k
)(
g0,i,j +
ν∑
r=1
gr,i,jω
rk
)∗}
= ν˜σ2A−E .
(58)
Since the channels are i.i.d. random variables with zero mean,
the expected values of the cross terms are zero. Each of the
diagonal elements of GkG∗k is the sum of magnitude of squares
of NA Gaussian random variables. Hence, each entry is Chi-
square distributed. The off-diagonal entries are the sums of the
products of independent complex Gaussian random variables;
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hence, their means are zero. As NA →∞, the matrix GkG∗k is
approximately given by
GkG
∗
k ≈ σ2A−E ν˜NAINE . (59)
The random variable [GkAkA∗kG∗k ]i,i/( 12σ
2
A−E ν˜) is Chi-
square distributed with 2Ns degrees of freedom since the el-
ements of GkAk are complex Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variance ν˜σ2A−E each. Hence, the expected value
of [GkAkA∗kG∗k ]i,i is ν˜σ2A−ENs . The expected values of the
off-diagonal entries of GkAkA∗kG∗k , [GkAkA∗kG∗k ]i,j , are ze-
ros. In a similar fashion, we can derive the distribution of the
random matrix HkAkA∗kH∗k .
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
When 1− N sNA 
N c p
N , the CP insertion matrix can be ap-
proximated by an identity matrix since the CP size is negligi-
ble. Moreover, as NA →∞, BB∗ ≈ IN (NA −N s ) and QQ∗ ≈
INA (N +N c p ) . Hence, GG∗ ≈ FNE RcpNE G˜(FNE R
cp
NE
G˜)∗ and
the covariance matrix of the interference at Eve in (20) becomes
ΣAN = θΓE
(
αGG∗
N(NA −Ns) +
αGG∗
N(NA −Ns) + NcpNA
)
=θΓEGG
∗
(
α
N(NA−Ns) +
α
N(NA −Ns)+ NcpNA
)
≈ θΓE
N(NA −Ns)GG
∗ (60)
where the last equality holds when 1− N sNA 
N c p
N . Substituting
with ΣAN in (60) into (19) leads to (21). Moreover, substituting
with RA−B in (10) and RA−E in (21) into (15), we obtain the
secrecy rate in (22), which is independent of α.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Since GAΣx (GA)∗ and GG∗ in (21) are block-diagonal
matrices, Eve’s rate in (21) can be rewritten as
RA−E =
N∑
k=1
[
log2 det (θΓEGkAkΣxk (GkAk )
∗
×
(
θΓE
N(NA −Ns)GkG
∗
k + INE
)−1
+ INE
)]
(61)
which is equivalent to processing each subcarrier individually.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Using Appendixes C and D, we approximate the matrices in
(19) and (20) when NA is very large as follows.
1) From Appendix D, we showed that ‖[GkAk ]i,i‖2
/( 12σ
2
A−E ν˜) follows the Chi-square distribution with 2Ns
degrees of freedom, and the mean of ‖[GkAk ]i,i‖2 is
E{‖[GkAk‖2]i,i} = ν˜σ2A−ENs .
2) The matrix GA = blkdiag(G1A1, . . . ,GN AN ) has di-
agonal entries whose variances are Ns ν˜σ2A−E . The matrix
GA (GA)∗ has off-diagonal elements [GA (GA)∗]i,j
= giAkA
∗
kg
∗
j , which represent the sum of Ns i.i.d. com-
plex Gaussian products, where gi is the ith row of the
matrix Gk . The ith diagonal element of GA (GA)∗
is [GA (GA)∗]i,i = giAkA∗kg∗i , which follows a Chi-
square distribution with mean σ2A−E ν˜Ns .
3) Consider the matrix GG∗: The matrix G is a block-
diagonal matrix and, hence, GG∗ is also a block-diagonal
matrix. The expected value of each of the diagonal entries
of GG∗ is equal to NA ν˜σ2A−E . The off-diagonal entries
are the sum of the product of independent complex Gaus-
sian random variables; hence, their means are zero. Hence,
GG∗ is approximated as NA ν˜σ2A−EINE N .
4) Each row of RcpNE G˜ is composed of ν + 1 i.i.d. com-
plex Gaussian random variables. Hence, the expected
values of the off-diagonal elements of the matrix
RcpNE G˜(R
cp
NE
G˜)∗ = RcpNE G˜G˜
∗RcpNE
∗
are zero. As NA
→∞, we can approximate this matrix by
NA ν˜σ
2
A−EINE N . Hence, P>NE FNE R
cp
NE
G˜G˜∗RcpNE
∗
F∗NE
PNE ≈ NA ν˜σ2A−EINE N as NA →∞.
Based on our earlier discussions, we have the following
relations:
E
{
[GAΣx (GA)
∗]i,i
}
=
ν˜σ2A−E
N
(62)
where Σx = 1N s N IN s N , and
ΣAN = θΓENA ν˜σ
2
A−EλαINE N (63)
where λα =
(
α
N (NA −N s ) +
α
N (NA −N s )+N c p NA
)
. Hence
ΣAN + INE N =
[
θΓENA ν˜σ
2
A−Eλα + 1
]
INE N . (64)
Define a scalar p(α) as
p(α) = θΓENA ν˜σ
2
A−Eλα + 1. (65)
The inverse of ΣAN + INE N is 1p(α) INE N . Hence
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗ (ΣAN + INE N )
−1 + INE N
=
θΓE
p(α)
GAΣx (GA)
∗ + INE N .
(66)
Using the Hadamard inequality [32], we can upper bound
Eve’s rate in (19) as follows:
log2 det
(
θΓEGAΣx (GA)
∗ (ΣAN + INE N )
−1 + INE N
)
≤ log2
NE N∏
i=1
(
θΓE
p(α)
[GAΣx (GA)
∗]i,i + 1
)
. (67)
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Using the properties of the logarithmic function
RA−E ≤
NE N∑
i=1
log2
(
θΓE
p(α)
[GAΣx (GA)
∗]i,i + 1
)
. (68)
The upper bound in (68) is the sum of NEN concave functions;
hence, by using Jensen’s inequality, Eve’s average rate is upper
bounded by
E{RA−E} ≤
NE N∑
i=1
log2
(
θΓE
p(α)
E
{
[GAΣx (GA)
∗]i,i
}
+ 1
)
.
(69)
Using (62), we obtain
E{RA−E} /
NE N∑
i=1
log2
(
θΓE
p(α)
ν˜σ2A−E
N
+ 1
)
= NEN log2
(
θΓE
p(α)
ν˜σ2A−E
N
+ 1
)
.
(70)
Substituting for p(α) from (65) into (70) and using the fact that
NA  Ns , the upper bound on Eve’s average rate is given by
E{RA−E} / NEN log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜σ2A−E
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
+ 1
+1
⎞⎠.
(71)
Since N is much larger than Ncp , N + Ncp ≈ N .6 Hence, the
right-hand side of (71) becomes independent of α. This implies
that the average Eve’s rate is not a function of α. Hence
E{RA−E} / NEN log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜ σ 2A−E
N + 1
+ 1
⎞⎠ . (72)
The rate of the Alice–Bob link is given by
RA−B = log2 det (θΓBHAΣx (HA)
∗ + INB N ) . (73)
The matrix HAΣx (HA)∗ can be approximated by its
diagonal elements as a weighted identity matrix. Hence,
HAΣx (HA)
∗ ≈ 1N s N NA ν˜σ2A−BIN s N . Consequently, Bob’s
average rate can be approximated by
E{RA−B} ≈ log2 det
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−BIN s N + IN s N
)
= log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)N s N
= NsN log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
.
(74)
Using (71) and (74), and since E{Rsec} = E{RA−B}
− E{RA−E}, we obtain the result in (24).
6If we did not use the approximation that N + Ncp ≈ N when we allocated
the powers to data and spatial-AN symbols as discussed in Section II-B, the term
α/N in (71) will be replaced with α/(N + Ncp ). Hence, we will not need the
assumption that N  Ncp at this point of the proof to show the independence of
the upper-bound on Eve’s rate on α. This remark is also valid for the expression
in Eqn. (75).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
When ΓBσ2A−B and ΓEσ2A−E are sufficiently high, we have
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
− NEN log2
⎛⎝ θN
θ
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
) + 1
⎞⎠ . (75)
Letting Kα = N
(
α
N +
α
N +N c p
)
,
7 we lower-bound the average
secrecy rate as follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
− NEN log2
(
θ
θKα
+ 1
)
. (76)
Thus
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
+NEN log2
(
θ
N s
N E
)
+ NEN log2
(
θKα
θ + θKα
)
= NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
+ NEN log2
(
θ
N s
N E
θKα
θ + θKα
)
. (77)
The first term is independent of θ; hence, to increase the lower-
bound, Alice needs to choose the value of θ, which maximizes
the second term only. This is equivalent to maximize the term
inside the logarithmic function. Let
f(θ) = θ
N s
N E
θKα
θ + θKα
. (78)
When N  Ncp , Kα ≈ 1. Hence
f(θ) ≈ θ N sN E θ = θ N sN E − θ N sN E +1. (79)
The first derivative of f(θ) is given by
δf(θ)
δθ
=
Ns
NE
θ
N s
N E
−1
θ − θ N sN E . (80)
The root of the first derivative is given by
θ? =
1
1 + N sNE
=
NE
NE + Ns
. (81)
The second derivative is given by
δ2f(θ)
δθ2
=
Ns
NE
(
Ns
NE
− 1
)
θ
N s
N E
−2
−
(
Ns
NE
+ 1
)
Ns
NE
θ
N s
N E
−1 ≤ 0 (82)
7If we did not use the approximation that N + Ncp ≈ N when we allocated
the powers to data and spatial-AN symbols, Kα = 1.
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since NE ≥ Ns , which is a reasonable assumption to enable Eve
to decode the data.
Substituting with the optimal value of θ in (81) into (77), the
average secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz is lower bounded as follows:
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
+ NEN log2
((
NE
NE + Ns
) N s
N E
(
1− NE
NE + Ns
))
.
(83)
Rearranging the expression in (83), we obtain the result in (28).
When there is no eavesdropper in the network, the average
secrecy rate (i.e., average rate of the Alice-Bob link) is
E{RA−B ,noEve} = NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
≈ NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
.
(84)
The average secrecy rate loss due to the presence of Eve, denoted
by E{SLoss}, is thus given by
E{SLoss} = E{RA−B ,noEve} − E{Rsec}
/ NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
− NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B
)
− NEN log2
((
NE
NE + Ns
) N s
N E
(
1− NE
NE + Ns
))
.
(85)
Rearranging (85), we obtain
E{SLoss} / NsN log2
(
NE + Ns
NE
)
+ NEN log2
(
NE + Ns
Ns
)
.
(86)
Hence, the average secrecy rate loss in bits/s/Hz is given by the
expression in (30).
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
In the low ΓEσ2A−E  1 regime, θΓE
(
α
N ν˜σ
2
A−E
+ αN +N c p ν˜σ
2
A−E
)
≈ θ ΓEN ν˜σ2A−E  1. Hence, the upper-
bound on Eve’s average rate in (72) is approximated as
follows:
E{RA−E} / NEN log2
⎛⎝ θΓEN ν˜σ2A−E
θΓE ν˜ σ 2A−E
N + 1
+ 1
⎞⎠
= NEN log2
(
ΓE
N ν˜σ
2
A−E + 1
θ ΓEN ν˜σ
2
A−E + 1
)
≈ NEN log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
.
(87)
Consequently
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
θΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
− NEN log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
. (88)
From (88), the lower-bound on the average secrecy rate is max-
imized when θ = 1. Hence
E{Rsec} ' NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
− NEN log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
. (89)
When there is no eavesdropper in the network, the average
secrecy rate is
E{RA−B ,noEve} = NsN log2
(
ΓB
NsN
NA ν˜σ
2
A−B + 1
)
. (90)
Accordingly, in the low ΓEσ2A−E ≤ ΓBσ2A−B regime, the aver-
age secrecy rate loss is given by
E{SLoss} / NEN log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
. (91)
The average secrecy loss in bits/s/Hz is given by
E{SLoss} / NEN
N + Ncp
log2
(
ΓE
N
ν˜σ2A−E + 1
)
. (92)
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